The Prison Conditions Cases and the Bureaucratization of American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications by Feeley, Malcolm M. & Swearingen, Van
Pace Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 2 Spring 2004
Prison Reform Revisited: The Unfinished Agenda
Article 4
April 2004
The Prison Conditions Cases and the
Bureaucratization of American Corrections:
Influences, Impacts and Implications
Malcolm M. Feeley
Van Swearingen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Malcolm M. Feeley and Van Swearingen, The Prison Conditions Cases and the Bureaucratization of
American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Implications, 24 Pace L. Rev. 433 (2004)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/4
The Prison Conditions Cases and the
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Influences, Impacts and Implications
Malcolm M. Feeley*
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Introduction
By almost any measure, it is clear that, over the past thirty
years, litigation has had a dramatic impact on the nation's jails
and prisons. New doctrine has become part of the established
legal landscape.' The Plantation Model, securely ensconced in
southern prisons as late as the 1970s, is now socially unaccept-
able and has been largely dismantled. 2 Sadistic treatment at
the hands of inmate trustees is a thing of the past. Instruments
of torture routinely employed in Southern prisons just a few
years ago have been relegated to the museums. Inmates can
now expect to receive nourishing meals and adequate medical
care. Nowadays, basic services and amenities are routinely
made available to all prisoners. And although these practices
and expectations are at times honored in the breach, officials
feel compelled to lie about or acknowledge problems and prom-
ise remedies when failures are exposed. It has now become so-
cially unacceptable to acknowledge many practices that just a
few short years ago were standard operating procedures or rec-
onciled as regrettable by-products of a challenging task.
* Malcolm M. Feeley is a Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor of Law at
the University of California, Berkley. He has written numerous articles and is the
author of several books including Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State.
He is a graduate of Austin College and holds an M.A. and Ph.D. from the Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
** Van Swearingen is a graduate of the University of Texas at Austin and
holds an M.P.P. from the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of
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1. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICAS' PRISONS (1998).
2. See id. at 39-41.
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Of course it is easy to overstate the benefits of litigation
and court orders. Judicial decrees have not been uniformly ef-
fective; old patterns have reappeared as soon as courts have
turned their attention elsewhere or terminated jurisdiction.
Prison officials have responded with symbolic rather than real
responses. And with mounting prison populations, even well-
intentioned officials have seen their institutions regress. Fur-
thermore, in light of the historical cycle of neglect, violence,
crowding, scandal, reform, and the revulsion Americans feel to-
wards criminal offenders, it would be foolhardy to expect that a
handful of litigators and federal judges acting by themselves-
even over the course of thirty odd years-could fundamentally
alter the structure and culture of America's prisons and jails.
Whatever they are, prisoners' rights groups are not major pow-
ers in American political life, and courts are not powerful vehi-
cles for social change. 3 Still, despite these limits, judicial
intervention in prison conditions appears to be a distinct and
singular success. 4
The question is: why? In the face of so many failures, why
have the courts been at least relatively successful in formulat-
ing and implementing orders affecting prison conditions? In an
earlier examination, Feeley and Rubin explored at great length
the distinctive techniques the courts have used to define and
attack the problem of prison reform, and that analysis goes
some considerable way to explain how courts were ultimately
successful in such endeavors. 5 Although we quickly review
some of the features of the courts' approach below, the thrust of
the discussion that follows attributes the relative success of the
courts to several other factors as well. As Feeley and Rubin
noted earlier, the judges in such cases abandoned their tradi-
tional judicial role as "interpreters" of preexisting norms and
explicitly embraced a policy-making role. 6 However, these
judges did not act alone. As policy makers, they drew on and
reinforced powerful national trends that were already well un-
3. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that courts by themselves can never effect
significant social change).
4. See generally, FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 13-15.
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derway by the time they were drawn into the reform effort.
Furthermore, when these judges did become involved, far from
cutting across the currents of these reform efforts, they drew on
and reinforced them. Finally, these superintending judges self-
consciously sought institutionalized reforms by strengthening
the organizational capacities of correctional systems through in-
creased bureaucratization.
Part I of this article explores the distinctive policy-making
approach that was pressed upon receptive judges by creative li-
tigators. Part II examines how litigation both drew upon and
fostered other powerful and parallel reform efforts. Part III de-
scribes how the courts enhanced and deepened the bureaucratic
capacities of prisons and prison systems. A concluding Part IV
reflects on the implications of increased bureaucratization, find-
ing in it mixed, though overall positive, consequences. Al-
though bureaucracy is an effective way to improve safety,
security, and services for prison inmates, and for tightening su-
pervision and accountability of correctional officers, it also en-
hances the capacity to control. Thus the most distinctive
accomplishment of prison conditions litigation is something of a
double-edged sword. Even as it has enhanced prisoners' rights,
it has strengthened officials' capacity to control.
Similar observations have been made earlier. Nearly
twenty-five years ago, even before prison conditions litigation
hit full stride, James Jacobs identified the trajectory that prison
conditions litigation had taken, and outlined a "strategy for
evaluating the impacts of the prisoners' rights movement."7 He
argued that the prisoners' rights litigation must be understood
as part of a more general movement of "victimized minorities,"
and saw it as "part of a [broader] mosaic of social change" that
would not have been possible without activism of the federal ju-
diciary and some stamp of approval by the justices of the United
States Supreme Court."8 He then went on to note that "a com-
plete sociopolitical history of the prisoners' rights movement
would have to take federal and state legislative and administra-
tive activity into account,"9 and concludes that its most endur-
7. James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-
1980, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 430 (Michael Tonry et al. eds., 1980).
8. Id. at 432.
9. Id. at 434.
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ing effect was to increase both the professionalization of
correctional personnel and the bureaucratization of correctional
organizations. 10 Although this article does not attempt the com-
prehensive analysis that Jacobs proposed, it does address two of
his central concerns, the involvement of other branches of gov-
ernment and the increased rationalization of correctional
institutions.
I. Judges as Policy Makers
Judicial intervention is admittedly an odd way to reform
prisons, but the litigators who brought the cases and the judges
who ruled on them were not unaware of, nor unsympathetic to,
this observation. 1' Consequently, despite the language of indi-
vidual rights that gives rise to and shapes so much constitu-
tional litigation, prison conditions cases were about institution
building: clarification of basic mission, insistence on tight and
responsible administration, development of written policies, ca-
joling legislatures to increase funding, and garnering public
support for change. These goals were not explicitly articulated
by prisoners' counsel or judges in these cases, but they were
loosely and intuitively embraced by both. The unarticulated
reason: in the "organization society," the protection of individ-
ual rights requires competent and constrained administration.
Bureaucracy fosters rules, supervision, and accountability, and
in so doing substitutes the rule of law for the will of the ruler.
This concern with structure and organization emerged al-
most at the outset, in response to challenges in the earliest and
most egregious cases that came from the South, where a dis-
10. For a similar discussion on developments in police administration particu-
larly in "pattern and practice," cases see Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of
Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department "Pattern and Practice" Suits in
Context", 22 ST. L. U. PUB. L. REV. 3 (2003). See also, SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING
THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990 (1993)
[hereinafter TAMING THE SYSTEM].
11. The traditional model of the judicial role limits judges to fact finding and
interpreting pre-existing rules. However, at times judges can and do make policy.
By policy we mean identifying a goal-an end-and then self-consciously taking
steps to reach that goal. For an extended examination of policy making as a nor-
mal role ofjudges see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1 at 204-96; Edward L. Rubin &
Malcolm M. Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989 (1992); see
generally, Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and
Litigation Against the Government, 7 U. OF PA. J. OF CONST. L 617-64 (2003).
[Vol. 24:433
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/4
PRISON CONDITION CASES
tinct model of the prison had long been entrenched. Here pris-
oners not only routinely faced unspeakable cruelty and
inadequate resources, but were subjected to a wholly distinct
prison culture that did not exist elsewhere in the United States.
The Southern model, derived from the slave plantation, envi-
sioned a self-contained, self-sufficient prison, subsisting on
goods and services provided by prison labor, and which, like the
plantation of old, could be run at a profit.12 Throughout its his-
tory, the plantation prison system did occasionally operate as
planned and return funds to the state. But even when it did
not, relative to prisons in other parts of the nation, it was inex-
pensive. The plantation model depended upon inmate rather
than free-world guards, quartered prisoners in squalid barracks
not cells, engaged them in forced labor, and denied them basic
services and amenities. 13 In many respects the results were
worse than slave plantations. Slave owners had incentives to
protect their human capital. Prison officials had none; slaves of
the state were disposable. This was the reality confronting fed-
eral judges as they faced constitutional challenges to prison sys-
tems in the South. Reform required not just improvement but a
reconceptualization of the enterprise. The situation in the
North and West was different. There the plantation model had
never taken hold and modern practices of penology and public
administration had been embraced in name, if not in fact.14 In
these areas, the problem was not a failure of vision, but a fail-
ure of practice. Still, here too, the challenge was immense, and
once the courts had come to a conception of the modern, consti-
tutional prison, this model was used to assess prisons outside
the South as well.' 5
Once they adopted this challenge, judges were forced to be-
come policy makers and administrators. And like all good ad-
ministrators, they depended on experts for guidance. Initially
when formulating remedial orders, they relied on the testimony
of well-regarded correctional administrators who had served as
expert witnesses.' 6 Later, when they were on the verge of be-
12. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 153.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 150-51.
15. Id. at 169-70.
16. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 307.
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coming bogged down with the task of implementing their or-
ders, they turned to a similar group of qualified authorities to
serve as special masters and monitors.1 7 Nowhere did judges-
or prisoners' rights lawyers-attempt to innovate on their own.
Nowhere did judges offer a new or novel approach to penology.
Nowhere did any judge strike out boldly to promote new alter-
natives. Nowhere did they even draw on penological thinking
from outside the United States. Although many lawyers who
brought the cases, and perhaps even some judges who decided
them, may have occasionally dreamed about more far-reaching
reforms, none apparently asked a court to consider them seri-
ously. Rather, the litigators and the judges in these cases
sought out and relied on the best and the brightest among the
acknowledged leaders in American corrections. The master
conclusion that linked this disparate group of successful liti-
gators and judges and permitted them, almost overnight, to be-
come involved in the minute details of prison administration
was bureaucratization and rehabilitation. These were not new
and novel ideas, but the best of conventional thinking that had
long been advocated by reform-minded prison officials
themselves.
Indeed, one need look no further than the 1959 edition of
the Manual of Correctional Standards,8 published by the
American Correctional Association (ACA), the professional as-
sociation of prison officials, to find the perspective embraced by
the courts in the prison and jail conditions cases in the 1970s.
Initially published in 1946 and revised periodically thereafter,
this volume set forth a host of standards that are grounded in
the ideas of bureaucratization and rehabilitation.19 Since its
first publication, the Manual has been the Bible that has
shaped the thinking of correctional administrations and guided
prison reform efforts. Once these professionals embraced a pol-
icy-making stance, it is no small wonder that the courts seized
upon it as well.
In the worst prison systems, those in the South, the judges
confronted cruelty, torture, and outmoded, feudal-like institu-
tions; here the task of the courts was to transform them into
17. Id. at 309.
18. AM. CORR. ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS (1959).
19. See id.
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modern bureaucratic institutions. Somewhat later in the
North, the courts confronted dispirited prison systems that
could not manage according to their own rules. And every-
where, they discovered under-performing institutions whose
leaders grudgingly acknowledged that they were unable to im-
plement what they knew to be their responsibilities. In all of
these cases, judges embraced conventional penological thinking,
not some new and untested idea. In Arkansas, for instance,
Judge Henley drew heavily on the testimony of James V. Ben-
nett,20 former head of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
who, in essence, recommended that the state adopt standard
BOP policies. Judge Henley, and the other judges who came
after him, followed this advice. Far from undermining correc-
tional management, they sought to strengthen it. Realizing
this, these experts quickly came to see that litigation provided
them with a bully pulpit.
This alone, however, would not have ensured success. For
instance, courts were not able to act so decisively and effectively
in cases involving challenges to conditions in mental institu-
tions. Like prisons, state mental institutions have a long his-
tory of neglect and abuse, and indeed the first big "institutional
conditions" case was brought against Alabama's state mental
institutions.21 Here too, after some hesitation, the courts em-
braced the challenge. And here as well, judges turned to ex-
perts. However, they found that experts disagreed vigorously
on what to do with the seriously mentally ill. Some favored
deinstitutionalization. 22 Others embraced the idea of commu-
nity-assisted living in group homes. 23 Still others favored re-
forming the large-scale institutions, where professional staffs
and programming were available around the clock.24 This lack
of consensus frustrated litigators and judges; when they looked
20. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Jackson v.
Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated by, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968).
21. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
22. See generally Alina Perez et al., Reversing the Criminalization of Mental
Illness, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 62 (2003).
23. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSEN-
SUS PROJECT 136-51 (2003), available at http://consensusproject.org/downloads/En-
tire-report.pdf
24. See CITIZEN'S COMM. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE, AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE & NAMI MAINE, REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF SERVICES FOR
2004] 439
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
at the existing institutions they were revolted by what they
found, but they could not turn to a ready-made model as a re-
placement. As a consequence, institutional litigation against
mental institutions cannot be judged a success. In contrast,
there was consensus among experts as to what a good prison
should look like. Judges seized upon this model, adopted it as
their own, and set about implementing it.
Judges embraced policy making in prison conditions cases
in still another way. They acquired staffs. As students of public
policy have come to realize, much policy is made in the process
of implementation, through the continual adjustment between
policy makers and operational administrators as general goals
are translated into a myriad of detailed plans that must con-
front the reality of the work place. 25 Judicial policy making in
the prison conditions cases followed this process. Initial court
orders read like reports of legislative committees or administra-
tive agencies. They contain long recitations of findings that
identify a problem and then point towards a solution. But they
leave the details to be worked out later by the affected institu-
tions. However, when it became clear that corrections officials
were unwilling or unable to attend to these details and develop
meaningful plans for implementation, the judges were drawn
more deeply into the implementation process, and demanded
still more detailed plans. Eventually they turned to experts for
help. They appointed special masters to assist them-and the
parties-in finding facts, developing implementation plans, and
monitoring compliance. This expanded capacity of the courts
further merged the process of policy making and implementa-
tion in just the ways that students of public administration de-
scribe. If in these cases judges appropriated the role of agency
heads, special masters in effect became their special assistants.
Masters served all the roles commonly attributed to executive
assistants. Like special assistants everywhere, they were in-
tensely loyal to their bosses and to their mission. And like spe-
cial assistants everywhere, ill-defined roles allowed them to
PERSON WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN MAINE'S JAILS AND PRISONS: 2002 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.prisonsucks.com/scans/maine/maine-mental-illness_2002.pdf.
25. JEFFREY PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT
EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (3d ed. 1984).
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exercise the authority of their bosses. 26 Given near free-range
to roam through the prisons, special masters served as eyes and
ears for their bosses, and thus allowed their judges to stay on
top of problems without becoming bogged down in details. And
because they often had backgrounds in prison administration,
they were a valuable source of expertise for their judges, all the
more so because their communications were unmediated by
cumbersome adversarial proceedings.
Although the legal process school holds that the form of ad-
judication also prescribes its limits, 27 prison conditions cases re-
fute this assertion. As they shifted functions and embraced
policy making, the courts took on new forms. They were goal-
directed problem-solvers. They embraced executive-like poli-
cymaking; they engaged in the nitty-gritty of implementation
where policy battles are often won or lost; and when they were
on the verge of getting bogged down, they acquired staffs. 28 Al-
though reasonable people might assess the results of these ef-
forts differently, as would be the case with policy making
generally, what is less disputable is that by embracing this
stance, judges dramatically expanded their capacities. By ac-
quiring the accoutrements of policy makers, judges succeeded
as policy makers. And for the most part they adopted the sorts
of policies that prison officials themselves would have wanted.
This is hardly surprising, since the courts-like reformed-
minded administrators-took their ideas from experts in the
field.
26. This has occasioned a great deal of complaints. Critics argue that the role
of special masters should be established and bounded at the outset. See generally
James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of
Limits on Special Masters, 666 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (2001); Susan P. Strum, A Nor-
mative Theory of Public Remedies, 79 GEO. L. REV., 1355 (1991). Yet, every study
of the tasks of special masters emphasizes just how contingent and unpredictable
the job is. See David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court Ap-
pointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV.
313 (1981); see also Sturm, supra.
27. See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV.
353 (1978); RUBIN & FEELEY, supra note 1, at 330-33.
28. At the height of the Texas prison conditions case, Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d
814 (1998), Judge Justice's special master was the size of a small law firm or re-
search unit, with a staff of fourteen and a budget of over one million dollars per
year. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 86-90.
20041 441
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II. Prison Conditions Litigation and the National
Political Process
To conclude that the courts adopted a policy-making stance
and set about implementing a ready-made model provided by
the corrections profession does not mean that their task was or
could have been accomplished through litigation alone. The cu-
mulative effect of the judicial intervention was substantial, in
both its direct and indirect effects. Indeed, litigation has proba-
bly been the single most important source of change in prisons
and jails during the past forty years. Yet the greatest effect of
this litigation was to consolidate efforts that were being pro-
moted and pursued in several settings simultaneously. Bold lit-
igation strategies and dramatic court orders provided a
substantial additional impetus to these efforts, but litigation
did not occur in isolation. As has already been suggested, litiga-
tion was successful in large because judges drew on a well-de-
fined model that had long been promoted within the corrections
field itself.29 Although many corrections officials publicly ex-
pressed indignation at being pushed into action by the courts,
many secretly and not-so-secretly welcomed the lawsuits, and,
as we have seen, prominent leaders came to regard the court-
room as a bully pulpit. Litigation became one more forum for
promoting reform. In this sense, prison conditions litigation
must be understood as both a cause and an effect of change:
cause, because judges forced change upon reluctant and recalci-
trant prison officials, and effect because litigation reinforced
trends that were already well-underway and widely embraced.
Specifically, litigation reinforced and reflected four power-
ful trends; it: 1) strengthened the process of professionalization
within corrections; 2) embraced and fostered national standards
for corrections; 3) expanded the federal government's interest in
and oversight of state and local institutions; and 4) represented
the last step in constitutionalizing the criminal process. Taken
as a whole, these various efforts had a tremendous impact upon
inmates' conditions of confinement. They placed prison reform
on the public agenda. They strengthened institutional capacity.
They contributed to the recruitment of better informed and
more highly trained staff, imposed increasingly stringent stan-
29. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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dards on correctional agencies, and they placed the weight of
powerful national organizations on the side of institutional re-
form. Seen in this light, litigation is part of a larger mosaic of
normal politics, where a variety of forces come together to
change public perceptions and fashion new policies. Courts
thus were neither the bold adventurers they are sometimes
made out to be, nor reactive bit players limited by form and
function. Rather, they were active participants in a reform pro-
cess that was proceeding apace on several stages simultane-
ously. In the discussion below, we situate the prison conditions
cases in this larger reform movement, showing how litigation
was both a cause and an effect of reform.
A. Reform Through Professionalization
Prison conditions litigation enhanced and accelerated the
professionalization of corrections in two important ways. It pro-
vided a new and important forum for national correctional lead-
ers to promote ideas they had long advocated; and it fostered
the recruitment of a new type of correctional administrator. In
case after case, the same small handfuls of nationally respected
leaders were called upon to serve as witnesses, advise the court,
and serve as special masters and compliance officers. They
used their newfound platforms to advocate their long-standing
ideas for reform, speaking not just to likeminded colleagues as
they had in the past, but to powerful judges, and through them,
to powerful state legislators, governors, and newspaper editors
who, as often as not, were the real audience for their testimony.
Litigation also fostered a new generation of correctional ad-
ministrators who embraced the views of these national leaders
and accepted the role of the courts in stimulating changes in
their institutions. As late as the 1970s, the prison systems in
many states remained a world apart, one of the last bastions of
public service to be exempt from standard civil service require-
ments, modern bureaucratic structure, and meaningful political
accountability. They continued to be staffed and administered
by good or boys who were recruited through a system of pa-
tronage, and all but ignored by governors and legislators. 30 Al-
30. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 182, 193; see also Christopher E.
Smith, The Governance of Corrections: Implications of the Changing Interface of
20041 443
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though this form of organization was being eroded by forces
wholly independent of the prisoners' rights movement, litiga-
tion hastened its demise. Litigation requires articulate, knowl-
edgeable officials who are able to defend institutional practices
and prepare and respond to written regulations, not bumbling
yokels who defend practices according to their own predilections
and whose policies change with each shift. With its emphasis
on due process, administrative regularity, written rules, and
the like, litigation fostered the recruitment and promotion of of-
ficials who were comfortable doing these things. In courtroom
after courtroom, old-style administrators simply could not cope.
They could not describe operations clearly, they could not de-
fend practices in terms of written rules and standards and they
could not formulate satisfactory plans for change. Eventually
they were replaced by better educated, more professionally ori-
ented officials who could and would do these things.31 This does
not mean that judges themselves fired old officials and hired
new, professionally oriented replacements-although at times
they did just this. Rather, when state and local officials saw
that incumbents could not deal effectively with the courts, they
appointed those who could. And these officials were likely to be
reform-minded correction officials more in tune with modern
correctional views and national standards. For instance, in
Santa Clara County, California, the board of supervisors first
accepted the de facto receivership that placed the jail in the
hands of an experienced correctional administrator appointed
by the court, and then in effect fired the elected sheriff and re-
placed him with an experienced correctional administrator. 32 In
Texas, the top rung of the old-style leadership was eventually
replaced by professionals with experience in military prisons,
and still later with a director whose background was in account-
Courts and Corrections, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2002, at 117 (2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/criminaljustice2000/vol-2/02e2.pdf.
31. Nathan Glazer argues that it promotes those with "theoretical knowledge"
and more education over those with "practical knowledge" gained from experience.
At least in respect to school administration, he argues that this yields a net loss
and undermines important sources of authority. See Nathan Glazer, The Judici-
ary and Social Policy, in THE JUDICIARY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (L. J. Thebrese
ed., 1979). We see no evidence that this is the case-in the long run-in prisons
and jails that have been under extended impact of court orders.
32. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 120-25.
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ing and budgeting, skills that were deemed invaluable in an or-
ganization with an annual budget of over one billion dollars.33
In California until the late 1970s, superintendents of correc-
tional institutions almost always came up through the ranks of
the security division, but by the late 1980s eleven of the state's
fourteen prison superintendents had been recruited from the
ranks of prison social workers, parole agents, and education
specialists-not guards.34 And everywhere litigation forced
states to develop written rules and regulations for prison
governance.
In some instances litigation has had an even more direct
and immediate effect upon the recruitment of a new type of cor-
rectional administrator. In response to litigation, many correc-
tions departments have established "compliance coordinators"
or "litigation coordinators," whose jobs are to serve as liaisons
between attorneys for the department (usually in the state at-
torney general's office) and the corrections department, to help
coordinate the defense and, after a ruling, to help oversee com-
pliance to the court order. Such liaison positions have become
so common that the American Correctional Association and the
American Jail Association have established membership sec-
tions for "compliance coordinators." From conversations with
sheriffs and those active in the associations, it appears that
many of the best and the brightest younger administrators are
often tapped for these positions.
In these and a host of other ways, litigation promoted
professionalization and facilitated opportunities for a new gen-
eration of administrators. Indeed, many of these administra-
tors have come to regard judicial intervention in a positive light,
or at least take it in stride as part of the landscape of modem
correctional administration, if not public administration more
generally. This of course does not mean that they all welcome
judicial intervention or agree with everything a court may or-
der. Most corrections officials find much to criticize in court or-
ders, but this new cohort of professionals does not instinctively
defy, and does not resist root and branch. They are comfortable
with the idea of prisoners' rights and judicial intervention, and
33. See id. at 80-85.
34. See id. at 120-25.
2004] 445
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though they may chafe at increased paper work or occasional
inexplicable orders, they have no quarrel with the modem ad-
ministrative structure that the courts have forced upon them.35
B. Reform Through Promulgation of Standards
Until well into the 1970s, many local jails and state correc-
tional systems operated without one of the central features of
modern governmental agencies, a rational-legal bureaucratic
structure. Such institutions were pre-bureaucratic in the most
primitive sense of the term; they operated outside the main-
stream of administrative developments that have, since the
New Deal, become commonplace in public agencies. However,
the transformation of penal institutions into modern bureaucra-
cies began long before the onset of the prisoners' rights move-
ment and litigation. In most jurisdictions outside of the South,
litigation was probably not the primary cause of these develop-
ments. Rather, it shored up, expanded and cemented changes
that were already well under way. Litigation filled in the
blanks as it were, and forced more concrete and more detailed
specifications. In the South, however, litigation was a major
transformative force. It required corrections officials, governors
and legislators to rethink and reconceive the very nature and
function of their state's prison system. And even here the pic-
ture was mixed. In Texas, the court had to struggle to com-
mand the attention of corrections officials and was challenged
at each step of the way.36 However, in Arkansas, Commissioner
Sarver welcomed the litigation and used it to educate his subor-
dinates and legislators. Judge Henley forced very little on Com-
missioner Sarver that he did not want.37
35. This observation is revealed in the numerous conversations I have had
with corrections administrators.
36. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 80-85.
37. See generally id. at 61. Compared to other Southern states, Florida is
something of an anomaly. Modernization of its prisons began well before the pris-
oners' rights movement and proceeded apace without any comprehensive, system-
wide litigation. In the early 1960s, Florida's commissioner of corrections, Louis
Wainwright, began transforming that state's correctional system along lines advo-
cated by national corrections leaders, and by the mid-1980s Florida was the only
state that had all of its prisons certified as meeting all the standards set by the
American Correctional Association. Although there were a number of important
cases involving Florida prisons, none required the sort of root and branch involve-
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Once they began to manage prisons, judges seized upon the
ready-made standards that were urged on them by prisoners'
rights lawyers and their expert witnesses. These standards
were developed by professional associations and were incorpo-
rated into the regulations in the most highly regarded prison
systems. In turn, seeing the use to which the courts put stan-
dards accelerated their standards-setting activities. Through-
out the 1970s and 1980s a host of associations, often supported
with federal funds, produced an ever-increasing variety of stan-
dards. Some associations, such as the Society of Refrigeration
and Heating Engineers and the American Medical Association,
were organizations of technical specialists whose primary inter-
ests were not prisons, but which nevertheless developed stan-
dards for use in institutional settings, including prisons.
Others were professional groups with long-standing interests in
legal affairs, such as the American Bar Association, which years
earlier had developed guidelines for the administration of crimi-
nal justice as a way of staving off litigation. The national gov-
ernment also became involved in the standards setting
process.38 In the 1960s the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration (LEAA) provided financial support and its prestige
to promote the Standards and Goals Project in conjunction with
the American Correctional Association, as well as the ABA's
Minimum Standards of Justice project. Similarly, the National
Institute of Corrections, the U.S. Department of Justice, and
the U.S. Public Health Service all promoted the advancement
and adoption of national standards, practices and policies. Fur-
thermore, federal agencies offered financial support to state and
local agencies that would adopt either its standards or exem-
plary programs that it had funded. 39
National concern for countrywide standards long predated
the prison conditions litigation and in fact stemmed from the
same general concern that gave rise to litigation itself, the de-
sire to modernize the criminal process and to respond to the
ment by the courts that took place in Arkansas, Texas and elsewhere in the South.
See id. at 165-66.
38. See id. at 162. However, rather than withdrawing from the review of state
criminal procedure, the federal courts used these standards when it formulated
constitutional rules governing the criminal process.
39. See generally id. at 385-86.
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emergence of the rights consciousness of the 1960s. Indeed, the
particular forms of rationalization that the courts imposed on
the prisons probably derive more from the agenda of the Ameri-
can Correctional Association and the recommendations of the
Task Force Reports of the President's Crime Commission of the
1960s than from any original insights provided by prisoners'
rights lawyers or the courts themselves. Had these standards
not been readily available, it is not clear that the courts would
have created them from whole cloth.
There is always a danger that standards adopted by private
associations (such as the ACA or any of the other professional
organizations that promulgated standards for health care, diet,
heating and ventilation, and the like in prisons) will represent
the interests of the institutions they are designed to regulate
rather than the interests of the public or consumers served by
these interests.40 No doubt there is some truth to this fear, but
as Ross Cheit has shown, standards produced by such associa-
tions are often dictated by technical judgments of professionals
rather than politically concerned bureaucrats or self-serving
agents of industry.41
Whatever the case, courts turned to these professional or-
ganizations and their standards with some frequency when as-
sessing the efforts of prison officials to improve conditions in
their institutions. Such efforts have had far-reaching conse-
quences. Standards pertaining to food service, medical care, ed-
ucation, access to legal materials, and rehabilitation often
specify not only the nature of the substantive service to be pro-
vided-say, the types of food and number of calories-but also
the qualifications and training of the staff required to provide
them. Thus, for instance, the Public Health Service not only
sets standards for balanced diets, but also recommends that
certified dieticians supervise prison kitchens and prepare this
food. 42 Thus, embracing one standard to deal with one espe-
cially egregious problem-for instance, to assure sanitary con-
40. See, e.g., THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1976).
41. Ross CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE SECTORS (1990).
42. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Health Services Division, Food Services
Branch, at http://www.bop.gov/hsdpg/hsd.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2004); see gen-
erally Smith, supra note 30, at 142-43.
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ditions in a prison kitchen-would often draw courts into a
complex web of regulations. Standards come in packages.
On May 5, 1969, in Holt v. Sarver,43 when Judge Henley
took his first tentative step towards restructuring the Arkansas
prison system, he relied heavily on the testimony given by
James Bennett and other experts for establishing the criteria
for assessing prison conditions.44 Bennett, in turn, appears to
have drawn much of his testimony directly from the Manual of
Correctional Standards published ten years earlier by the
American Correctional Association. Fourteen years later,
Judge Henley's successor, Judge Eisele, continued to rely heav-
ily on standards, which by then had grown considerably in vol-
ume and covered many more aspects of prison administration.
Indeed, many of these standards had, since Judge Henley's first
ruling, been incorporated into the state's administrative code
and prison regulations. During the intervening fourteen years,
standards had been both the cause and effect of the litigation.
They had supplied plaintiffs' attorneys, the court, and the com-
pliance officer with criteria for assessing a host of different con-
ditions in the prisons, and had provided these same people with
criteria for breathing specificity into general orders and assess-
ing efforts to comply with them. In turn, the standards offered
guidance to department officials anxious to take whatever steps
were necessary to free themselves from the court.
We do not mean to suggest by this that litigation was re-
sponsible for the promulgation of national standards, or that
federal judges seized indiscriminately upon professional stan-
dards to define constitutional minima. Professional interest in
developing standards predated litigation by many years, and
the courts employed a variety of other sources by which to as-
sess conditions as well.45 But professional standards were read-
ily available, associations were anxious to develop them and
federal agencies were willing to fund and promote them. Litiga-
43. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd by, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
44. See id.
45. See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, 21st Annual Ed-
ward V. Sparer Symposium Suing the Government: Velaquez and Beyond: Judicial
Policy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617,
657-59 (2003).
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tion provided one more impetus for both the production and the
promotion of standards.
C. Reform though the National Political Process
Historically, Congress has regarded criminal justice admin-
istration as a state and local matter and taken great pains not
to appear to encroach upon the prerogative of the states. The
first big debate over this occurred with the establishment of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the 1920s. 46 This de-
bate is rekindled periodically each time Congress enacts federal
criminal laws but is muted by the fact that, as a practical mat-
ter, federal law enforcement officials generally defer to state
officials.
However, since the 1960s there has been a slow but steady
increase in federal involvement in selected aspects of state and
local criminal justice administration. A watershed event was
the establishment of the President's Crime Commission, and
the publication of its reports in the mid-1960s. 47 Perhaps the
major contribution of the commission was its successful intro-
duction of the concept of a criminal justice system, a term that
until publication of the commission's reports had rarely, if ever,
been used.48 This admonition to develop a "system" to overcome
undefined discretion and balkanization in the criminal process
set the agenda for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA), which was established in 1968.49 LEAA's mission
was to distribute federal funds to state and local criminal jus-
tice agencies in order to promote innovation and efficiency in
46. See generally FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND
METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 31-50 (1980) (discussing
the creation of the Federal Bureau of Investigations).
47. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE (1967); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS (1967).
48. See, e.g., Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice, in THE
FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY (David Nelken ed., 1994); see also SAMUEL WALKER, TAM-
ING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990
(1993).
49. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3701 (repealed 1984).
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the criminal process, and in so doing to foster a national, profes-
sional perspective to replace the insularity and particularism of
local criminal justice agencies. 50
This trend has continued through both Democratic and Re-
publican Administrations. In 1974, Congress established the
National Institute of Corrections to provide technical assistance
and advice to state and local corrections departments. 51 In 1980
it passed the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA) to provide a statutory basis for federal involvement in
litigation challenging conditions in correctional institutions,
and to establish federal standards for state and local correc-
tional institutions.52 And the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 199453 continued this trend, further linking
local crime policy to national concerns. As federal funds are
passed on to support activities of state and local criminal justice
agencies, Congress has begun to attach conditions. National
crime policy follows the course of normal politics.
CRIPA in particular reveals the extent to which prison con-
ditions reform represents a broad-based national commitment,
and is far more than judicially imposed policy. Enacted by an
overwhelming vote in both houses of Congress, this statute con-
stituted an explicit recognition of the federal oversight role in
state and local corrections and other institutions of confine-
ment. The act authorizes the use of Department of Justice re-
sources to challenge conditions that exist "pursuant to a pattern
or practice of resistance" by state officials to correct conditions
that are so "egregious or flagrant" as to "deprive [inmates] of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States .. . ,,54 By providing
for the creation of federally approved standards, Congress
staked out an important federal interest in state and local insti-
tutions. And by authorizing federal support for legal challenges
50. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, §100, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (setting forth the Con-
gressional intent behind, and a statement of purpose for, the establishment of the
LEAA).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 4351 (1994).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1980), amended by Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
53. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 30201-30208, 31001-31002, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (1996).
2004]
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
to substandard conditions, it legitimated the role of the courts
in pressing for improvements in these institutions. Although
CRIPA has never been used vigorously, it remains something of
a sleeping giant. Under an aggressive administration it could
be used to effect far-reaching changes in the nation's custodial
institutions. More generally, its very existence is testimony to
the fact that in the conditions cases the federal courts were not
out on a limb by themselves. Although the courts may have
been there first, the other branches followed suit. All three
branches of the national government are now thoroughly imbri-
cated in the formulation of policy for and oversight of state and
local custodial institutions. With relatively little fanfare or re-
sistance, federal involvement with corrections has come to re-
semble federal involvement with other policy areas: education,
transportation, welfare, and police, to name a few.
Admittedly, some of this national commitment has been
rolled back in recent years, although it has not been brought to
a halt. Growing pressure from prison officials about "frivolous"
suits, continuing complaints from federal judges about over-
crowded dockets, and mounting get-tough-on-crime pressures
coalesced in the early 1990s, and all branches of the national
government retrenched. Appellate courts cut back on standing
and took other steps to trim the power of trial courts. Congress
adopted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 5 in 1996 that
erected still more obstacles in the paths of would-be prisoner
petitioners, and limited the scope and duration of the role of
special masters in ways that precipitated a marked decline in
complaints filed by individual inmates. 56 And public officials
everywhere embraced longer sentences and supported construc-
tion of new prisons. Despite all of this, neither the PLRA nor
other actions have sought to undo the central substantive gains
of the earlier litigation. Although massive class actions are now
largely a thing of the past and individual prisoners have much
more difficulty in successfully petitioning the federal courts,5 7
these cut backs have not stymied class actions seeking struc-
55. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915; 42 § U.S.C. 1997 and other scattered
sections).
56. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1157 (2003).
57. See id.
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tural reforms altogether. Structural reform on the order of
Ruiz58 or Holt v. Saver59 may no longer be attainable, but cor-
rections departments are still being sued to expand and im-
prove services. Corrections officials we have spoken to in
California report that, despite CRIPA and an increasingly con-
servative federal appellate judiciary, experienced litigators can
and do still successfully litigate conditions issues pertaining to
medical services, mental health services, and conditions in wo-
men's prisons.
D. Reform through the Expansion and Constitutionalization
of Rights
The prison conditions cases can only be understood as a
part of the much broader rights revolution. Indeed, the very
term "prisoners' rights movement" reflects roots in the civil
rights struggle. Prison reform litigation is a lineal descendant
of Brown v. Board of Education60 and the rights movement that
it spawned. Many of the leading litigators-Alvin Bronstein
6
'
of the ACLU's National Prison Project, as well as William Tur-
ner,62 attorney in the Texas case, Ruiz v. Estelle, and Philip
Kaplan 63 in the Arkansas case, Holt v. Sarver-had extensive
experience in civil rights litigation in the South prior to shifting
their interests to prisons. Indeed, they all thought of their
prison litigation as a natural extension of their earlier work.
Although the courts played a significant role in this process,
they were not alone either. The struggle for civil rights took
place in many forums and locations. Although there is debate
about how important the courts were in the struggle, everyone
would agree that the struggle eventually resulted in an ex-
panded set of nationally recognized rights that came to be ac-
knowledged and protected by all branches of the national
government.64 Here too, the struggle for prison reform paral-
58. Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814 (1998).
59. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd by, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 106.
62. Id. at 81.
63. Id. at 61-62.
64. See Rosenberg, supra note 3; see also MICHAEL W. McCANN, RIGHTS AT
WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM & THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
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lels, and must be understood as part of, this larger
development.
However, prison conditions litigation can be understood as
part of another, more specialized development-the constitu-
tionalization of the criminal process. Beginning in the 1930s
but accelerating markedly in a series of landmark rulings in the
1960s, the Supreme Court in effect constitutionalized state
criminal procedure. The earliest cases focused on the judicial
process, insisting upon minimum standards for a fair trial,65
and then expanded to include the right to counsel 66 and the su-
perintendence of capital punishment.6 7 Another set of cases es-
tablished constitutional standards for police. 68 Thus having
established constitutional standards for courts and cops, it was
a small step to extend oversight to the third component of the
criminal process, corrections. In this sense, the prison condi-
tions cases of the 1970s and 1980s are the final step in a consti-
tutionalization of the criminal process that had began in the
1930s.
Perhaps the closest parallel to national efforts to improve
prison conditions are the parallel efforts to reform police depart-
ments. Through a combination of inspired national leadership,
the development of countrywide standards, and the press of pro-
fessionalism and litigation, American police departments have
undergone a major transformation in the past forty years.69
Vast areas of practice once exercised at the non-reviewable dis-
cretion of individual officers have been domesticated by consti-
tutional law imposed by the courts and internal regulations
promulgated by police departments. According to the leading
student of this development, Samuel Walker, courts have
played-and continue to play-an important part in this devel-
opment. However, he emphasizes, they are just one of several
institutions that have pressed successfully for increased
accountability. 70
65. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
66. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
68. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 436
(1966).
69. See generally Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Jus-
tice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. L. REV. 815 (1999).
70. See Walker, supra note 10; see also TAMING THE SYSTEM, supra note 10.
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III. Towards Bureaucratization
Although they were motivated by different concerns and
supported by different groups, the efforts described above all
contributed to further rationalization of correctional systems.
They were part of a process designed to drag pre- and under-
bureaucratic (and at times, feudal) criminal justice institutions
into the modern administrative world. They may have differed
in emphasis and conflicted in important detail, but they shared
the same aim of modernizing the criminal process. Even the
standards setting projects launched by the ABA and supported
by the LEAA and other national efforts in the 1960s (estab-
lished to stymie the efforts of the Warren Court) had as their
central goal the establishment of national standards. 71 In the
case of prisons, this typically meant more resources and further
bureaucratization in order to bring corrections into the main-
stream of public administration.
The effects of this project of modernization are dramatic
and readily apparent. Nearly twenty-five years ago, James Ja-
cobs could describe the prisons he had observed just a few years
earlier:
There were no written rules and regulations, and daily operating
procedures were passed down from one generation to the next.
Wardens spoke of prison administration as an "art"; they operated
by intuition. The ability of the administration to act as it pleased
reinforced its almost total dominance of the mates.
72
Today all this has changed. Even a cursory glance reveals how
dramatic the changes have been. For instance, with an FY2003
budget of $5.7 billion dollars, a staff of approximately 50,000 re-
sponsible for thirty-two prisons, 73 and an organizational chart so
complicated it cannot be presented on a single letter-sized page,
74
the California Department of Corrections (CDC) is a bureaucratic
behemoth. Though it is the nation's largest prison system, the
CDC is by no means unique in its relative size or the complexity of
its organizational structure. California's prison system, along
71. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
72. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 458.
73. See Calif. Dep't of Corr., About the Department, at http://www.corr.ca.gov/
CommunicationsOffice/facts-figures.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
74. Calif. Dep't of Corr., Department Organizational Chart, available at http:/
/www.corr.ca.gov/Personnel/OrgChart.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
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with every other state's, has undergone tremendous changes
brought about in part by litigation.
Over the past thirty years, prison systems around the coun-
try have not just expanded in numbers of inmates and guards,
they have undergone a distinct process of bureaucratization
that has shaped institutional mission and structure in a host of
specific, identifiable ways. An analysis of the bureaucratic
transformation of American prisons is well beyond the scope of
this article, 75 and so we must content ourselves with outlining
some of the most salient features of this transformation.
In doing so, we turn to Max Weber, who first and most
clearly identified the importance of bureaucracy for modern so-
cieties, and to Victor Thompson, who systematically applied
Weber's insights to the analysis of American public administra-
tion. Weber was the first to methodically identify the key crite-
ria of the bureaucratic form.76 Compared to other forms of
organization, he argued, modem bureaucracy is defined by a ra-
tionalized set of rules and regulations that bind the organiza-
tion together. 77 Every office is arranged in a clear hierarchy of
superordination and subordination, with employees subject to a
rigid and systematic set of policies designed to maintain control
and discipline when necessary. 78 Offices within the bureau-
cracy are characterized by their fixed and definite division of
organizational responsibility, and are staffed by highly trained
officials who are appointed by merit, have set salaries and pen-
sions, secure careers, and duties that are clearly separated from
their private life.79
In the United States, Thompson extended Weber's idea to
contemporary American public administration,80 and in so do-
75. For an important study of contemporary prison administration, see JOHN
I. DiLULIO, GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORRECTIONAL MAN-
AGEMENT (1987). This is an important book, but one that is strangely critical of
prison conditions litigation. For a more nuanced view see DiLulio's discussion of
prison litigation in his edited volume, JOHN I. DILuLIo, COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND
THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS
(1990).
76. MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 650-78 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al., trans., 1968).
77. Id. at 973.
78. Id. at 957.
79. Id.
80. See generally, VICTOR A. THOMPSON, MODERN ORGANIZATION 10-24 (1961).
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ing emphasized additional characteristics of the modern state
bureaucracy: routinization of organizational activity, factoring
the general goal into subgoals, formalistic impersonality, cate-
gorization of data, classification of persons, slowness to act or to
change, and preoccupation with the monistic ideal-the system
of superior and subordinate relationships in which the superior
is the only source of legitimate influence upon the
subordinate.8 '
Taken together, the works of Weber and Thompson provide
a framework for evaluating the process of bureaucratization
within prisons. Below we provide several examples that demon-
strate just how deeply entrenched these features of modern bu-
reaucracy have become in contemporary prisons. Using
Weber's and Thompson's criteria to identify core features of bu-
reaucracy, today's correctional systems can be characterized as
being: 1) defined by an organizational structure with clear divi-
sions of power and responsibility, 2) bound by a rationalized set
of rules and regulations, 3) run by a highly specialized
workforce, 4) reliant upon the classification of individuals, and
5) accustomed to the routinization of organizational activity.
Though much of the evidence that we provide below has been
culled from an ongoing project investigating this process within
the California prison system, the examples provided here also
reveal a national phenomenon. The process has been so sweep-
ing that an investigation into almost any area of prison opera-
tions will turn up evidence of some type of increased
rationalization. The examples stand in sharp contrast to the
portrait of prisons of the 1950s presented by Jacobs in the quote
above.8 2
1. The bureaucratic prison is defined by an organizational
structure with clear divisions of power and responsibility. Per-
haps the most recognizable aspect of modern bureaucracy is a
hierarchical structure with clear duties assigned to each divi-
sion. Today, every state has a department of corrections that
operates under a clearly defined organizational structure. Most
of these organizational structures can even be found on the In-
ternet, graphically displayed with hierarchically ordered boxes
81. Id. at 14-20.
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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describing each division within the department. Though many
of the units within these organizations have been a part of the
institution from day one, some were created specifically in re-
sponse to prison litigation.
In 1974, the Supreme Court extended a number of procedu-
ral protections to prison inmates.8 3 Shortly thereafter, the Cali-
fornia Department of Corrections adopted a set of internal
grievance procedures to deal with inmate complaints.8 4 Some
time later, the CDC administrators established the Inmate Ap-
peals Unit to handle this new process.8 5 Over the years, the
Unit's functions have expanded to include proactive oversight of
inmate appeals, and it now operates directly under a Policy and
Evaluations Division. The Inmate Appeals Unit receives quar-
terly reports from each individual prison and assembles an an-
nual report documenting trends in inmate grievances. These
reports are used in a proactive way, to identify and then solve
the most frequent types of problems that generate inmate com-
plaints. Similarly, the CDC's Facilities Standards and Opera-
tions Division was created in the 1990s in response to
litigation.86 Working directly with plaintiffs attorneys and
prison wardens, this unit is charged with developing corrective
action plans in ways that do not require further litigation.
These illustrations reflect a common practice. Thirty years
ago, the editors of the U.C.L.A. Law Review surveyed California
prison officials and found that virtually every administrator
contacted indicated that they had engaged in some type of insti-
tutional changes in anticipation of litigation.87 That practice
continues today. In a 2001 national survey of prison and jail
83. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
84. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 1073 (2002) (establishing an "inmate griev-
ance procedure").
85. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084 to .7 (2002) (establishing the right to
appeal "any departmental decision ... which [the inmate] can demonstrate as hav-
ing an adverse effect upon their welfare").
86. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997); Clark v. Califor-
nia, 123 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Calif. Bd. of Corr., Board of Correc-
tions-Major Duties and Responsibilities, Facilities Standards and Operations
Division, at http://www.bdcorr.ca.gov/aboutboc/htm-docs/aboutboc.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 22, 2004).
87. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 454-55.
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administrators, Margo Schlanger88 reported similar findings:
about 70% of institutions reported some type of operational
change in response to litigation. Actions of the respondents
ranged from modifying disciplinary policies to adding new and
specialized staff positions to establishing entire new divisions.
8 9
Although virtually all the successful litigation against pris-
ons was directed against state institutions, the increased
bureaucratization it stimulated took hold in the federal prison
system as well. Norman Carlson, who headed the Bureau of
Prisons from 1970 until 1987 managed to avoid many of the
court-ordered reforms by staying, in his words, "one step ahead
of the courts."90 Carlson paid close attention to national trends
in prison litigation, reorganizing the BOP in line with contem-
porary professional standards in order to avoid such litigation
himself. As illustration, he restructured the federal BOP into
five regional units, each with its own headquarters and regional
director. In turn, individual prisons then amended their poli-
cies so that each wing or "unit" of a prison maintained a team of
correctional officers and counselors who were responsible for
everything from sanitation to security. Carlson made certain
that each policy, mundane and major alike, was institutional-
ized in writing and backed up with a defensible rationale. One
result of such actions, Carlson felt, was that federal prisons
were never subject to the types of sweeping conditions litigation
common to state prisons. Every time one of the policies or prac-
tices in one his prisons was challenged, BOP officials could
point to a rule and a rationale for it.91 What the BOP did as a
matter of course and in part as a successful strategy to avoid
litigation, state corrections officials did after the fact, in re-
sponse to litigation. But the results were much the same in ei-
ther case.
2. The bureaucratic prison is bound by a rationalized set of
rules and regulations. Jacobs identified the process by which a
rationalized set of rules and regulations took hold in prisons in
88. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation: Results of a National Survey, JN
EXCHANGE (Nat'l Inst. of Corr., Longmont, Colo.), 2003, at 1, available at http://
www.nicic.org/pubs/2003/period232.pdf.
89. Id. at 8.
90. John J. DiLulio, Jr., Prisons that Work: Management is Key, FED. PRISONS
J., Summer 1990, at 11, available at http://www.bop.gov/ipapg/sum90fpl.pdf.
91. See id. at 10.
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the 1960s and 1970s. 92 Prisoners' rights litigation was success-
ful when prisons and correctional agencies were unable to point
to written policies that prescribed regulations and reasons for
them. In response, some state legislatures simply began to cod-
ify the requirements set forth in major prisoners' rights cases.
Other states passed on rule-making authority to their correc-
tional agencies and specified procedures for such authority. In
California, prior to 1975 the director of the CDC could simply
announce new policies whenever he saw fit. Now the process is
quite complex. When it makes revisions to the California Code
of Regulations (CCR), the Department of Corrections must ad-
here to the procedure set forth in the Administrative Proce-
dures Act that requires all proposed new rules to be subject to a
public hearing and comment process. 93 The CDC must then re-
spond to each comment, and, according to a recent law, provide
an analysis of the fiscal impact of the new rule.94 The final ver-
sion of the rule must then undergo further scrutiny by the Of-
fice of Administrative Law and be reviewed by the Secretary of
State before final approval. 95 Revisions to the CCR that affect
the Departmental Operations Manual must also be announced
in the Notice of Change to Departmental Operations Manual
and distributed to individual prisons. 96 This new procedure is
complicated, and staff routinely complains about "the Bureau-
cracy," "red tape," and "tied hands," and officials have devised a
host of ways to circumvent the process. Rather than announc-
ing "general" rules that initiate this complicated process, super-
intendents of individual prisons routinely announce "unique"
findings that trigger practices that are limited to only their in-
stitutions, and in so doing avoid the lengthy announcement and
comment process.97
Still, this process has entangled the CDC in the statewide
administrative process. The CDC is now subject to the state's
92. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 458-59.
93. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 11346.4 (West 2001); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
1, § 5 (2004); CAL. CODE REGS. tit 1, § 44 (2004).
94. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346.5(a)(6) (West 2001).
95. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 11349.1 (West 2001).
96. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11346.4 (West 2001); Calif. Dep't of Corr.,
Change of Department Opernations Manual Notice, at http://www.corr.ca.gov/Reg-
ulationsPolicies/Pages/NCDOM2002.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
97. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5058(c)(1) (West 2003).
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general requirements for rule making. Together title 15 of the
CCR, the section of the Code that addresses the Department of
Corrections, and the Department's own Operations Manual run
to more than 1500 printed pages and cover virtually every as-
pect of correctional operations. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
an issue that is not addressed in this document. For instance,
food service standards are presented in minute detail in the
Code of Regulations. To wit: article 4, section 3051 requires
that "A menu shall not include only one vegetable if pork or a
pork derivative was used in the preparation of the dish. A pork-
free version of the vegetable shall be provided."98 Although the
Department of Corrections had published "plans" for menus
long before the commencement of prisoners' rights litigation,
they were neither mandatory nor so sensitive to dietary con-
cerns of religious minorities. Litigation was an important impe-
tus for increased specification and content, as well as the fact
that suggested menus were transformed into bureaucratic
requirements.
3. The bureaucratic prison relies upon a highly specialized
workforce with extensive training. One of the most notable
changes remarked upon by senior prison administrators is the
shift away from the "old guard" culture of the pre-bureaucratic
institution.9 9 Older staff recall the days when criminal offend-
ers, once sentenced, lost virtually all rights. Now prison admin-
istrators universally acknowledge that inmates possess a host
of rights. This shift is partially a result of changes in recruit-
ment and training. As one senior CDC official observed of the
younger, more bureaucratically-minded staff, "they are more
educated, better trained, and are now in supervisory posi-
tions." 100 Slowly, but surely, prisons have gotten rid of the old
guard. But the shift is also due to changes in the new bureau-
cratic culture itself.
This change in the increased specialization of the workforce
can be seen in the personnel requirements outlined by the
CDC's Office of Personnel Management. Using a process called
"Job Analysis" to identify the entire set of tasks, knowledge,
98. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §3051(c) (2003).
99. Interview with Anonymous California Department of Corrections Admin-
istrator (Oct. 23, 2003).
100. Id.
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skills, and abilities required to perform a particular job, the de-
partment defines each job classification within the CDC in ex-
haustive detail. 101 Originally developed to comply with the
1978 Federal Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Proce-
dures Act,102 "Job Analysis" is a widely recognized tool used by
the department to make employment and management deci-
sions, save money, and increase productivity. The CDC now
routinely relies upon the updated "Western Regional Intergov-
ernmental Personnel Assessment Council"103 Job Analysis
method for classifying over 500 different positions within the
department.
One example will illustrate the high degree of specializa-
tion within the CDC. The position of "Facility Captain" is asso-
ciated with twenty-six different "tasks."104 The first requires a
captain to be able to:
Interpret and carr[y] out the policies of the Department of Correc-
tions (DOC) using the California Penal Code, California Code of
Regulations (CCR) Title 15, Departmental Operations Manual(DOM), Institutional Operational Procedures (IOP), Administra-
tive Bulletins (AB), etc., to ensure public safety, safety of staff andinmates, etc., under the direction of the Correctional Administra-
tor and indirectly by the Chief Deputy Warden or Warden.105
In addition, the Facility Captain must also possess six "knowl-
edges," five "skills," three "abilities," and one "special personal
characteristic. '"106 Whatever else he is, a Facility Captain is notjust one of the good ol' boys. California corrections is now thor-
oughly ensconced in the state's increasingly bureaucratic civil
service system. Although litigation may have hastened this in-
101. See Calif. Dep't of Corr., Personnel Examinations, Job Analysis, at http://
www.corr.ca.gov/Personnel/exams/jobanalyses/obanalysis.asp (last visited Aug.
22, 2004).
102. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1 to .18 (1982).
103. See Western Region Intergovernmental Personnel Assessment Council,
at http://www.wripac.com/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
104. Calif. Dep't of Corr., Facility Captain, Edited Task Listing, available at
http ://wvw.corr.ca.gov/Personnel/exams/J obanalyses/pdfs/FacilityCaptain/task.
pdf.
105. Id. at Task 1.
106. See Calif. Dep't of Corr., Facility Captain, KSA Listing, available at
http://www.corr.ca.gov/Personnel/exams/Jobanalyses/pdfs/FacilityCaptain/KSA.
pdf.
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corporation, once there the process has taken on a dynamic of
its own.
Corrections departments elsewhere have also been subject
to increased specialization as a consequence of litigation. In
fact, most prison systems have established specialized positions
just to handle litigation. Each prison in the Colorado Depart-
ment of Corrections has a "facility litigation coordinator" who
acts as a liaison between the prison and a central office of Legal
Services.107 Departmental regulations outline the responsibili-
ties for the holder of this position and list procedures that they
must follow. For states that have internal grievance proce-
dures, each prison usually has an appeals coordinator who re-
ports directly to the warden. The appeal coordinator is
responsible for logging inmate appeals and assigning them to
the proper staff member. Similarly, medical facilities have
medical appeals analysts who perform similar functions. Typi-
cally these and other executive staff meet with the prison war-
den weekly to discuss trends in inmate litigation and grievance
issues.
Another characteristic of the specialization within modern
prison bureaucracies is the commitment to highly trained staff.
The Virginia Department of Corrections has its own training di-
vision, the Academy of Staff Development, which has been in-
volved in employee training and development since 1976.108
That department provides training for positions at every level,
from basic correctional officers to management to food service to
mental health. In addition to assuring competence among staff,
training acts as a managerial tool to secure compliance with de-
partmental rules and as a means for institutionalizing court
orders.
4. The bureaucratic prison emphasizes inmate classifica-
tion. Twenty years ago a non-violent drug offender sentenced to
three years in an Arizona prison could be placed in a cell with
an inmate who had a history of violence and mental instability
and was serving a life sentence. Now such pairing is unlikely.
A consent decree in the 1983 case, Harris v. Caldwell, required
prison officials to establish and then follow a set of standards
107. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 108.
108. See Va. Dep't of Corr., Academy for Staff Development, at http://www.
vadoc.state.va.us/about/training/default.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
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for classifying and placing all incoming inmates. 0 9 Similar re-
forms have taken place in every prison throughout the country,
some as a result of litigation and others not. Just as correc-
tional staff is classified according to knowledge, skills, abilities,
and tasks, so too inmates are now assigned to specific institu-
tions, units, and cells according to their propensity for violence,
length of sentence, criminal history, and the like." 0
Although inmate classification is hardly new-it, too, pre-
dates litigation and is still one more example of the courts re-
quiring prison officials to follow their own suggestions--in
recent years it has become something of a high art, considerably
more complex than it once was. Indeed, since a unanimous
1998 Supreme Court ruling, the Americans with Disabilities
Act applies to state prisoners."' Everywhere, corrections de-
partments have had to develop facilities to meet the specialized
needs of disabled inmates as well as the capacity to generate
inmates' mental and physical disability profiles, no small task
given their problem-prone population. The expectation is that,
if done properly, diagnosis and classification will at one and the
same time promote rehabilitation, safety, and security. As one
senior prison administrator we interviewed put it, "if we've
done our job correctly, the inmate will get the best treatment
because of good placement." Showing pride in the system's ef-
forts to meet the needs of disabled inmates, he went on to say,
"inmates with disabilities get better treatment than many peo-
ple who live in cities." Furthermore, he concluded, "accurate as-
sessment and classification will reduce inmate violence and
protect both the prison and the prisoner."" 2
5. The bureaucratic prison provides a formal set of rules
and procedures that routinize organizational activity. Immedi-
ately following the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff v. McDon-
nell,1 3 the California Department of Corrections adopted an
109. See Ariz. Dep't of Corr., 1998 Annual Report: The Past Thirty Years, at
http://www.adc.state.az.us/AR98/AR98-30.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2004).
110. See James Austin & Kenneth McGinnis, Classification of High-Risk and
Special Management Prisoners: A National Assessment of Current Practices(2004), available at http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2004019468.pdf.
111. Yesky v. Penn. Dep't of Corr., 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997).
112. Interview with Anonymous California Department of Corrections Admin-
istrator (Oct. 23, 2003).
113. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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internal appeals process to handle inmate grievances. This pro-
cess is now described at length in the California Code of Regula-
tions, 114 and is implemented according to rules of the
Department of Corrections Operations Manual. Under this pro-
cedure, inmates "may appeal any departmental decision, action,
condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an
adverse effect upon their welfare" by filing a grievance peti-
tion. 115 The regulations governing the process presents a sys-
tem of four levels of review: one informal level and three formal
levels." 6 Inmates must exhaust the appeals process before fil-
ing suit in federal court.
When the grievance procedures were first implemented in
the CDC, officials looked upon the process as one more bureau-
cratic burden. However, they came to appreciate that this
grievance mechanism could be a tool for dealing with the daily
frustrations of inmate life. California officials came to believe
that states without such measures are more likely to experience
prison disturbances, and wardens began to use the appeals sys-
tem as a means for identifying recurring inmate problems as a
first step towards corrective action and new forms of staff
training.
The discussion above is only illustrative. It is meant to sug-
gest the variety of ways that the U.S. prison system has been
bureaucratized in response to the prisoners' rights movement.
Drawing on other aspects of Weber and Thompson's analysis of
bureaucracy would yield still further insights into and examples
of this process. Prison conditions litigation and the various
forces it unleashed and reinforced have contributed signifi-
cantly to this process over the past several decades. Although
the process has been incremental, is often contentious, and is
still ongoing, its mark can be seen in just about every facet of
modern prison administration.
114. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084 to .7 (2002).
115. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(a) (2002).
116. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, §§ 3084.5 (2002).
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IV. Conclusion: Assessing the Twin-Edged Effects of the
Prison Conditions Cases-Prisoners' Rights and
Bureaucratic Control
The discussion above can be summarized as follows: prison
conditions litigation has been successful because lawyers bring-
ing the cases were able to convince judges to abandon their
traditional role as appliers of rules and embrace a policy mak-
ing approach. In taking this new course of action, the courts
began to look like executive agencies. They adopted goals and
developed strategies to achieve them, including the creation of
staffs charged with overseeing their implementation. They suc-
ceeded in this effort because their agenda was already well-de-
fined. The appropriated a model of the modern bureaucratic
prisons that had been developed and aggressively advanced by
the corrections profession itself. However, this judicial embrace
of policy making is only a partial account of the success of their
effort. Litigation must be understood in the context of the more
general movement to modernize and impose national standards
on prisons. The courts were part of this broader project.
In this section, we explore some of the implications of this
project. In particular, we explore the double-edged sword of bu-
reaucracy. Even as it protects and limits against arbitrary
power, bureaucracy can also enhance and mask authority.
This, we think, goes a long way towards explaining why prison
conditions litigation quickly came to be accepted by corrections
officials themselves. Put succinctly, the reforms ordered by the
courts not only extended protections and services for inmates, it
increased the efficiency and effectiveness of prison administra-
tors as well. Enhanced bureaucracy meant a stronger
organization.
A conventional view of bureaucracy sees it as the enemy of
democracy, freedom and rationality, and the triumph of organi-
zation over the individual. Hierarchy wars against representa-
tion, domination challenges spontaneity, and capriciousness
extinguishes reason. Max Weber hints at this in his metaphor of
the iron cage. 117 And Franz Kafka's writings often depict Every-
117. Max Weber, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, 181
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1950).
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man caught in a bureaucratic nightmare. 118 If these images re-
present one aspect of bureaucracy, they also ignore another.
For bureaucracy is double-edged. If it restricts freedom, it also
constrains power. If it imposes limits, it also empowers. If it
squashes spontaneity, it also respects expertise. If it restricts
personal prerogative, it also purges particularism. If it imposes
red tape that hampers, it also promulgates rules that clarify. If
it imposes hierarchy that stifles, it harnesses the energies of
large numbers to common purpose. Like the law generally,
modern public bureaucracy empowers even as it limits.
In large-scale organizational settings, bureaucracy does not
just foster the role of law; it is the role of law. Modern public
bureaucracy is rational-legal organization, and as such it is a
web of rules and regulations whose legitimacy stems from the
authority of law itself. In this sense, as Weber instructs us,
modern public bureaucracy is a form of rational-legal authority
that replaces tradition and the force of personality as the basis
of authority. In essence, it has all the weaknesses and
strengths of law. It can cloak conflict in the guise of consensual
roles and mask power in the guise of due process. It can sup-
press local culture in the pursuit of abstract universals or gen-
eral principles. It can be the iron fist cloaked in the velvet
glove. But law also imposes a regime of rights and duties that
clarify responsibilities and standardize relationships. Through
a web of rights it can locate and protect the individual, and
through a web of duties it can define and constrain power.
It was this connection between bureaucracy and law that
transformed litigation to assure prisoners' rights into an effort
to strengthen prison bureaucracy. Despite the concern with in-
dividual rights, the language of prison conditions litigation-
that of both plaintiffs' attorneys and judges-is the language of
bureaucratic development. Issues were immediately character-
ized in terms of organizational competence, not individual
rights.119 Although odd at first blush, there is no contradiction
in this transformation. Prisoners' rights are about guarantee-
118. See, e.g., FRANZ KAFKA, THE PENAL COLONY: STORIES AND SHORT PIECES
(Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., 1976); FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Willa Muir &
Edwin Muir trans., 1937).
119. Contrast these with more rights-oriented police procedure rulings. See,
e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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ing rights of individuals, and so too bureaucratic development is
about extending the role of law. In the case of custodial institu-
tions, the best way to protect individual rights is through struc-
tural reform. In the context of prison conditions, this meant
transforming traditional organizations or underdeveloped bu-
reaucracies into modem rational-legal bureaucracies, and
teaching those who staffed these new bureaucracies to value
these roles. Thus from the outset the concern with the individ-
ual rights of prisoners was understood by the courts, as well as
plaintiffs' attorneys and the defendants themselves, as a con-
cern with structural reform of the organization.
There is an irony in all this: seeking to protect individual
rights by strengthening prison administration! But protecting
prisoners' rights and strengthening prison administration is not
a zero-sum game. One need not be purchased at the expense of
the other. Indeed, in an institutional setting, it is inconceivable
that individual rights could be enhanced without strengthening
organizational capacity. Structural reform of institutions re-
quires clarification of mission, which in the case of prisoners'
rights means enhancing concern for the dignity of inmates. But
it also means imposing on the organization a regime of rules to
replace particularistic practices. Thus a stronger prison organi-
zation, under a rational-legal bureaucratic regime, can foster
increased rights for prisoners.
But strengthening prisoners' rights through bureaucratic
enhancement also strengthens the prison administration's ca-
pacity to control. Better conditions for inmates, improved due
process, enhanced oversight and answerability, more resources
and all that these imply in prison settings, not only protect indi-
vidual inmates, but also enhance the institution's capacity to
control. Even as these rights erect zones of protection around
inmates, they also strengthen organizational capacity to clarify
goals, improve accountability, reduce particularism, gather and
interpret information, recruit more skilled employees and add
more resources. In short, strong bureaucracy is an efficient
means of clarifying goals and orienting people towards these
goals. This is, as Weber noted, the awesome power of
bureaucracy.120
120. See WEBER, supra note 76, at 973-80.
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The double-edged nature of conditions litigation also helps
explain why so many prison administrators almost immediately
came to welcome judicial intervention. Unlike Southern politi-
cians who opposed school desegregation orders because they
sensed desegregation would alter power relationships, and un-
like police and other public officials who failed to see the link
between exclusionary rules and improving police departments,
most prison officials realized immediately that prison condi-
tions-as distinct from prisoners' rights-litigation would re-
dound to their benefit. Indeed, rumors abound that many of
them secretly kindled such suits. This may also help explain
why prison conditions litigation was at its zenith not during the
height of the "rights revolution," but at a time when the move-
ment to promote "system" efficiency and expand prison capacity
was near its height. Far from being antithetical to each other,
the ACLU's National Prison Project, which sought to enhance
prisoners' rights, the Department of Justice's Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, which provided funding to foster
professional standards and enhance system efficiency, and the
American Correctional Association's campaign to professional-
ize correctional administration, are more closely related than
they might first appear to be. The apparent paradox is obvious:
increase rights of vulnerable prisoners by strengthening the ca-
pacities of correctional institutions themselves. But in fact, in a
bureaucratic setting, the former implies the latter. Indeed they
are two sides of the same coin. At one and the same time the
rule of law and bureaucratic development both empower and
limit.
Consider one rather mundane example. In 1982 a federal
court ruled that conditions in the Alameda County (Oakland,
California) jail were unconstitutional. Included in the court's
ruling was a finding that food service was unacceptable-food
was often substandard, was prepared by inadequately trained
personnel in a kitchen with leaky sewage pipes that ran across
the ceiling, was cold when served, and at times was arbitrarily
withheld from inmates. 121 Initially angry at being sued, Sheriff
Charles Plummer soon saw that the suit could help him obtain
a new, long-planned jail and that it could in fact help him ob-
121. Smith v. Dyer, Nos. 74184, 63779, 76086, 750121 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug.
15, 1983).
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tain a larger, better-equipped facility than he otherwise might.
So he helped write specifications into the consent decree that
went well beyond anything the court would have ordered. 122
When the crafty sheriff showed one of the authors around the
recently opened jail, he was proud of the food service facilities
and his strategy. He showed us an up-to-date kitchen super-
vised by a newly hired dietician. But the coup de grace was the
delivery system. Food was placed in Styrofoam trays, packed
into warming containers and delivered to inmates on a com-
puter controlled, driverless trolley that automatically uncoup-
led a cart in front of each inmate housing unit. The inmates
clearly benefited: quality control was dramatically improved.
And the possibility of arbitrariness was all but eliminated as
partitions were standardized and the distribution was mecha-
nized. So, too, the control system benefited, and per-unit staff-
ing costs were decreased. Furthermore, safety and security
were enhanced-although it can be argued that it is beneficial
to allow large numbers of inmates to walk through corridors
and eat in a central dining hall, it is difficult to argue that they
are deprived of a constitutional freedom by bringing warm, nu-
tritious food to groups of 50 to 200 inmates in their own com-
mon areas. And while some might find the high-tech design of
the new jail chilling, no one would make an argument that the
higher staff-to-inmate ratio it allows is unconstitutional. What
occurred here can be multiplied many times over, as improve-
ments in conditions for inmates simultaneously increased the
system's ability to control inmates and operate more efficiently.
The new structures and the increasingly rational-legal bu-
reaucratic system in which they are ensconced rests upon a
much firmer and more powerful form of authority than the old
prison systems provided. Inmates are now safer,123 and receive
more and better services, but prison officials command more ef-
fective power. Of course improvements brought about by this
development in bureaucratic rationalization must be off-set
against the burgeoning prison population, the rise of prison
gangs, and a host of pathologies that are endemic to even the
best-run prisons. Still, no one-prison inmate or correctional
122. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 363.
123. See, e.g., BEN CROUCH AND JAMES MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LIT-
IGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 216-20 (2000).
470 [Vol. 24:433
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/4
PRISON CONDITION CASES
officer alike-would now seriously entertain the idea of turning
back the clock to the pre-bureaucratic prison. Indeed, the awe-
some new problems confronting prisons can be handled as well
as they have been only as a consequence of the enhanced capaci-
ties brought about by increased bureaucratization.
But increased bureaucratization is a double-edged sword
for still another reason. Lauren Edelman and various collabo-
rators have written extensively about the problems of institu-
tionalizing rights in an organizational setting.124 Focusing on
business' responses to anti-discrimination laws, they have
found that although companies may be responsive to legal pro-
tections of employees' rights, internal regulations and grievance
procedures that have been developed are often empty shells.
When the authors scratch beneath the surface and take stock of
these new arrangements, they have often found more form than
substance. Businesses have been quick to seize on the language
of the law and develop structures that appear to be responsive
to newly articulated rights and newly required grievance proce-
dures. But they often leave the explanation of employees' rights
to "human resources" divisions that translate hard-edged em-
ployee rights into vague quests for "diversity," and oversee
hearings that reshape petitions for the vindication of rights into
group counseling sessions that allow disgruntled employees to
express their feelings in order to foster better communication.
Such activities may be beneficial in various ways, but they are
not responsive to the issues that gave rise to them. 125 The or-
ganization's rational legal response gives the appearance, but
not the reality, of responsiveness. Furthermore, Edelman and
her colleagues report, when employees turn to litigation, courts
tend to defer to their employers whenever it appears that well-
developed policies and procedures have been put in place. The
courts are reluctant to peer beneath the surface and businesses
124. Lauren B. Edelman & Stephen M. Petterson, Symbols and Substance in
Organizational Response to Civil Rights Law, 17 RES. IN SoC. STRATIFICATION AND
MOBILITY 107-35 (1999); Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regu-
lation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999) [herein-
after Endogeneity of Legal Regulation]; Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman,
The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. Soc. 479-515 (1997);
Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27
LAw Soc'Y REV. 479 (1993).
125. See id.
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quickly learn that they need to provide very little of substance
in order to obtain approval from the judiciary. As courts con-
tinue to develop deferential doctrines based upon thin evidence,
the authors warn, the new rights and the new procedures may
generate more problems than they solve. They may give the ap-
pearance of solving problems while in fact accomplishing very
little.
What holds for employees' rights in business organizations
may also hold for prisoners' rights. Corrections officials may
learn that they can ward off judicial scrutiny by adopting only
the patina of bureaucratic form. Indeed, something like this
has occurred with respect to dealing with inmate grievances.
Litigation (and at times, standards and national legislation) has
led to the widespread adoption of procedures to handle inmate
grievances. Yet an analysis of the operations of such proce-
dures reveals something of a Potemkin's village. On the surface
they appear to be fair and forthright, but as operated they ac-
complish little. Although there may be written regulations
spelling out inmates' rights, those charged with handling griev-
ances may not be familiar with these rules or have little or no
training as to how to administer the process. For instance, one
of the authors examined the inmate grievance process in the
California prisons, and found that those charged with handling
inmate grievances have little knowledge of applicable rules,
have inadequate training for the specific task and are at times
hostile to the process. "Instead of relying upon legal doctrines
[to resolve complaints]," he found, "many complaint handlers
turn to their own conceptions of what constitutes fair
treatment."126
To the extent that what Edelman and her colleagues have
found among businesses in their responses to anti-discrimina-
tion laws and Swearingen has found in the California prison
system with respect to handling inmate grievances is generaliz-
able, increased bureaucratic rationalization may mask
problems as well as solve them. This, of course, is a familiar
feature of bureaucracy, and one of the reasons that the very
term bureaucracy is synonymous with unresponsiveness. Fur-
126. Van Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights: An Investigation of the California
Department of Corrections' Internal Grievance Procedures (2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors).
472 [Vol. 24:433
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/4
PRISON CONDITION CASES
thermore, this process exacerbates problems in that it provides
form without substance, and gives the appearance of being re-
sponsive to problems while burying them. As we saw, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons adopted a policy of staying one step
ahead of the courts in an effort to ward off litigation. 127 Some
state prisons have followed this lesson.
Edelman's work suggests that organizations adopt rational
responses to legal threats based upon their understanding of
appropriate responses that are themselves modeled after tradi-
tional modes of law. 128 These efforts-which began as gestures
of compliance-are then recognized and legitimated by courts.
The prison accreditation process is one such example. After de-
cades of judges having held up professional associations' stan-
dards as the model to guide prison administration, prison
officials have sought out accreditation specifically in order to
avoid lawsuits. Prison administrators were not bent on improv-
ing the conditions of confinement for their inmates; rather, they
were looking for relief from litigation. Undoubtedly, profes-
sional associations' certification has benefited the living condi-
tions of inmates. However, the accreditation process provides
some leeway for prison administrators to have their say.
Twenty years ago, it was common for wardens to obtain waivers
from specific ACA standards yet still obtain certification. Al-
though it has become considerably more difficult to circumvent
specific standards, the ACA understands the delicate balance
between maintaining stringent standards and developing a
strong client base: tougher standards result in fewer prisons
seeking accreditation. Together, though not necessarily mali-
ciously, prison officials and the ACA have engaged in a process
that is both concerned with improving life behind prison walls
and creating the appearance of improving life behind prison
walls. Both seek to maximize their managerial goals through
ostensible attention to prisoners' well being.
Similarly, several departments of corrections have created
risk management units to strategically identify problem areas
in attempts to minimize liability exposure. Again, the recom-
mendations made by these units are driven by the goal to mini-
127. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
128. Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 124.
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mize the threat of litigation, not immediately out of genuine
concern over prisoners' conditions of confinement. As a result,
the reforms adopted are more likely to first and foremost meet
organizational needs, and only secondarily meet the needs of
inmates.
To the extent that the structures erected in this process are
genuine and responsive to the issues they address, this is all to
the good. But to the extent that they emulate the sorts of re-
sponses that businesses have given to anti-discrimination law,
they foretell of deeper conflicts. And even if they are conceived
with good will, as David Rothman has reminded us, a great
many prison reforms were born of conscience only later to
founder on convenience. 129 Given the pattern of neglect and
scandal and half-hearted reform that has characterized the his-
tory of prisons since they were first established, 130 there is no
reason to believe that prison conditions litigation or the bureau-
cratic rationality that it has spawned constitutes the end of his-
tory for this seemingly endless cycle.
Max Weber anticipated much of this. He saw the value, in-
deed the necessity, of rational-legal bureaucracy in modern,
complex society. And he saw that the rule of law and rational
organization were two sides of the same coin. He also antici-
pated the tensions and issues identified in the prison conditions
cases examined in this article. He appreciated the power, the
predictability, the protection, and the harnessing of energy that
rational bureaucracy yields. But he also saw the down side: ri-
gidity, impersonalism, domination, and control. Thus he came
to regard the development as a mixed blessing, an ongoing in-
soluble dilemma that would continue to beset modern socie-
ties. 131 The challenge is of course to determine the proper
balance between the contending impulses. The modern consti-
tutional prison may also be a mixed blessing. Conditions and
practices are much improved, and the constitutionalization of
the process assures that these improvements are likely to be
permanent. But bureaucratic form can easily be mistaken for
129. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).
130. See MICHEL A. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (A. Sheridan trans., 1977); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 131.
131. WEBER, supra note 76, at 975-80.
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substance. And whatever else the prison is, its central missions
remain the pursuit of safety and security by means of a tight
system of control. Litigation has made prisons more-not
less-effective and more efficient in the pursuit of this mission,
and it has provided departments of corrections with a new form
of legitimacy. And whatever their initial response to lawsuits,
corrections officials almost everywhere have come to realize
that, even as it benefits inmates, litigation can also be used to
strengthen control systems and increase their legitimacy. Per-
haps nowhere else is the metaphor of the "iron cage" as apt as it
is with respect to the modem, bureaucratic constitutional
prison.
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